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Abstract 
 
The performance of the EU long-term management plan for cod stocks, in force since 
2009, is analysed focusing on the human and institutional factors. The plan operates 
through landings quotas (TACs) and effort restrictions following a Harvest Control Rule, 
and deploys a novel instrument allowing Member States to ‘buy back’ or increase fishing 
effort for fleet segments engaged in cod-avoidance measures. The stipulated fishing 
mortality reductions have not been achieved. On the positive side, the ‘buy-back’ 
instrument has led to increased uptake of selective gear and implementation of permanent 
and real-time temporary closures. On the negative side, ignoring the dimension of fishers 
as reactive agents in the design, the impact assessment, and the annual implementation of 
the measures has contributed to the failure to adequately implement the plan and achieve 
its objectives. The main problem is that the landings quotas taken in a mixed fishery did 
not limit catches because fishers were incentivised to continue fishing and discard 
overquota catch while quota for other species was available. The effort limitations 
intended to reduce this effect were insufficient to adequately limit fishing mortality in 
targeted fisheries, although fishers experienced them as prohibiting the full uptake of 
other quotas. Recommendations for future plans include (i) management through catch 
rather than landings quotas, (ii) the internalisation of the costs of exceeding quotas, (iii) 
use of more selective gear types, (iv) the development of appropriate metrics as a basis 
for regulatory measures and for evaluations, (v) participatory governance, (vi) fishery-
based management, (vii) flexibility in fishing strategy at vessel level. 
 
Key words: cod recovery plan, fisher responses, Harvest Control Rule, mixed fisheries, 
results-based management, spatiotemporal measures 
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1. Introduction 
 
 
Worldwide, a large number of fish stocks are overexploited or depleted [1], and fisheries 
management has not always been successful in preventing or reversing these trends. 
However, several cases of successful management exist and fisheries scientists are 
analyzing the factors that may contribute to successful and unsuccessful fisheries 
management [2-6]. Fisheries management is evolving and drawing on the new insights, 
including in the context of management of depleted stocks where recovery is required. 
 
A successful recovery plan should have well-defined objectives to be reached over finite 
time-scales [5], clearly defined biological reference points, and a set of unambiguous 
harvest control rules agreed by all stakeholders that will determine the appropriate level 
of fishing in each year [6]. The monitoring process should be transparent with simple and 
easily understood metrics [5]. Prior to implementation the plan should be evaluated to the 
extent possible, by simulation, to ensure its robustness to prevailing uncertainties [7-9]. 
There is growing awareness that resource users should be involved in decision-making if 
fisheries management is to be sustainable [10, 11]. Successful plans often incorporate 
fishers into the science process in cooperative research activities [5]. 
 
Sometimes, however, the implementation of policies may have undesirable outcomes 
owing to the lack of a predictable relationship between the control measure used, e.g. 
landings or effort limits, and the outcome desired, e.g. a level of catch or fishing 
mortality [2]. Unsuccessful plans have often  taken little precaution in the face of such 
implementation uncertainties [5]. One source of unexpected outcomes that has not yet 
received much attention in fisheries management occurs when fishers respond in 
unanticipated ways, even if their behaviour is perfectly rational and could in principle be 
predicted; not taking the fisher behaviour into account may undermine management and 
threaten sustainability [2]. These problems arise if the basic mismatch between individual 
incentives and desired system-level outcomes is not fully understood or addressed [2, 5]. 
Among other problems, one of the most difficult seems to be the issue that within mixed 
fisheries the different stocks may differ in productivity and therefore need different levels 
of restriction of their removals [5, 12] and this may lead to ‘implementation overfishing’ 
[13] of the stock that is most in need of restriction. These mixed-fishery issues have been 
recognized as a problem in demersal-fisheries management by scientists, managers, and 
fishers [14], but in many cases have not yet been resolved. Murawski [5] concludes that 
the ‘ugly’ cases require creative and innovative solutions involving spatial management, 
“bycatch engineering”, and in some cases balancing short- and long-term social and 
economic tradeoffs. 
 
Since 1983 the European Commission (EC) has been managing the commercially 
exploited fish stocks in the European waters under the Common Fisheries Policy (CFP) 
[15], the main instruments of which are the annual Total Allowable Catches (TACs), 
supplemented by various technical measures, including closed areas/seasons, effort 
regulations and gear regulations. TACs were selected as the primary metric for control in 
order to allow annual stability in the national allocation of available resources, reducing 
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the scope for international arguments but leading to difficulties owing to the ‘relative 
stability’ implied by the agreement. Partly to avoid the annual political battles over 
setting the TAC, and partly as a result of  knowledge drawn from  successful fisheries 
management [6, 16], multi-annual or long-term management plans (MAMPs, LTMPs) 
are increasingly being implemented [17]. In EU waters, among other aspects, these 
MAMPs prescribe, usually through a Harvest Control Rule (HCR), how the annual TACs 
should be set and whether they should be accompanied by fishing effort restrictions or 
other technical measures.  
 
Following serious depletion of four of Europe’s cod stocks to well below the biomass 
limit reference points by the early 2000s, the EU agreed that stringent action was required 
to recover these and established a structured plan aimed at increasing stock biomass. The 
first cod recovery plan which aimed at recovering all four stocks with a common 
approach [Council Regulation (EC) No 423/2004] included requirements to reach 
biomass targets in a prescribed way and imposed a schedule of reductions in days at sea. 
In contrast with the current plan, where gear groupings are highly aggregated with only 8 
gear groups defined relating only to mesh size bands and generic gear types, the previous 
cod plan regulated fishing effort across 39 different pseudo-metiérs including definitions 
based on a range of other technical attributes of the gear, e.g. square mesh panels, grids 
and a variety of catch (landings) composition limits. In some cases there were perverse 
incentives to decrease mesh size due to higher effort allocations 
 
Traditionally in Europe, TAC and effort limitations of the type described above have 
been implemented as a broad-brush top-down management based on single-stock 
objectives, though for sole and plaice in the North Sea a joint plan has been implemented 
[Council Regulation (EC) No 676/2007]. However, it is becoming increasingly clear that 
these broad-brush regulations often lead to contradicting and perverse incentives, such as: 
the race to fish; the incentive to take up smaller rather than larger mesh sizes; and in 
mixed fisheries the incentive to go on fishing for species for which there still is quota 
available while legally discarding fish caught in excess of available quotas for other 
species [12, 18]. These undesirable consequences of management policies not only 
undermine the fisheries management objectives directly [2] but also result in low 
stakeholder support which is important for higher levels of industry compliance to 
management regulations [10, 19-23]. Thus, the EC is shifting away from its broad-brush, 
central and top-down management, towards governance on a more participatory and 
regional basis. The CFP reform in 2002 had already started a process of strengthened 
participation, and the EC is exploring further possibilities to increase participation in the 
decision-making process for future reform [24, 25]: it is envisaged that the general 
framework for fisheries policy would be set on the basis of a Commission proposal, but 
detailed implementing decisions, such as the types of gear or the areas and periods closed 
to fishing, could be taken at the regional or national level, and increased fishers 
involvement is encouraged. 
 
Reflecting this shift and noting little improvement in cod stocks, a revised management 
plan for the exploitation of four European cod stocks [Council Regulation (EC) No 
1342/2008 – hereafter called ‘the cod plan’ or ‘the plan’] was developed. The new plan is 
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based on an HCR specifying target fishing mortality rate (implemented through rules for 
setting TACs supplemented with effort limits), but, significantly, adds a set of new 
management instruments that encourage the introduction of bottom-up, or at least 
nationally proposed and organized, approaches to minimise cod catches (Articles 11 and 
13). These Articles provide incentives for cod avoidance in the form of an increase in 
allowable effort (Article 13) or total exclusion from effort restrictions (Article 11) if cod-
catch-avoidance measures are undertaken by a group of vessels. The way in which cod 
avoidance may be achieved is left open to the Member States and the industry, e.g. 
through the use of highly selective gear or implementing spatiotemporal modifications of 
fishing activity. As such, these articles are an innovative instrument following the new 
regional and fisheries-tailored ‘results-based’ management paradigm. ‘Results-based’ 
management has recently been described as: “instead of establishing rules about how to 
fish, the rules focus on the outcome and the more detailed implementation decisions 
would be left to the industry. Public authorities would set the limits within which the 
industry must operate, such as a maximum catch or maximum by-catch of young fish, 
and then give industry the authority to develop the best solutions economically and 
technically.” [24]. 
 
Another recent development in EU fisheries management is the recognition that 
controlling the actual catches through ‘catch quotas’, i.e. landings plus discards, is in 
general a more appropriate management tool [26, 27] than the traditional TAC, which 
refers to the total allowable landings where discarding of overquota catches is legal. 
Following this new ‘catch quota’ paradigm, some elements in the cod plan, notably 
Articles 11 and 13, explicitly refer to catches (interpreted as landings plus discards, as 
explicitly stated in Article 11 and implied in Article 13). However, it is important to note 
that the control of catches requires different methods, such as inter alia on-board 
observation by observers or cameras [27].  
 
This paper analyses progress so far on the road of improving fisheries management in the 
context of these new paradigms in setting fisheries policy. The cod plan is reviewed and 
compared against some ‘lessons learnt’ in the recent past to see which lessons have 
actually been taken on board and which have not. The paper considers new problems that 
arose when the new paradigms were gradually implemented and offers suggestions for 
further improvements. This paper focuses only on the human and institutional factors that 
may have influenced, positively or negatively, the outcome of the plan, but does not 
attempt to consider the biological factors influencing stock dynamics.   
 
 
2. The regulation 
 
The Regulation 1342/2008, establishing a long-term plan for cod stocks and fisheries 
exploiting those stocks, entered into force on the 1st January 2009. The Regulation 
establishes a plan for four cod stocks in the geographical areas of (i) Kattegat, (ii) the 
North Sea including the Skagerrak and the eastern Channel, (iii) the West of Scotland and 
(iv) the Irish Sea. Management for the North Sea cod stock is shared by the EU and 
Norway, and the HCR for this stock has been developed jointly by the EU and Norway. 
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The plan includes an obligation for the Commission, on the basis of the advice from the 
EU Scientific and Technical Committee for Fisheries (STECF) and after consultation 
with the Regional Advisory Councils (RACs), to evaluate the impact of the management 
measures on the cod stock and the fisheries on those stocks in the third year of its 
application, and then each third successive year. The authors of this paper have been 
actively involved in the impact evaluation that was undertaken by a joint STECF-ICES 
expert group (hereafter called ‘the group’) between February and June 2011. Most of the 
material referred to in this paper has been produced specifically for that evaluation; for 
methods of analyses and other details the report produced [28] should be consulted. 
 
2.1 The objective 
The only stated objective in the regulation is [Article 5(1)] “to ensure sustainable 
exploitation of the cod stocks on the basis of maximum sustainable yield” through 
achieving fishing mortality rates (F) of 0.4 or below [Article 5(2) and Article 8(4)]. In 
practice, while fishing mortality rates are currently too high, this means the plan’s 
objective is to reduce them toward or below F of 0.4.  
 
2.2 The HCRs and the TACs 
The HCRs (except the one for the North Sea cod stock) specify that the ultimate target F 
is 0.4 unless the stock is below the minimum spawning biomass level (Blim, as defined for 
each stock in the plan, Article 6), in which case F is to be reduced further by 25% per 
year. The annual reductions in F needed to reach the target are 10%, 15%, and 25%, in 
the respective cases that SSB is (i) at or above the precautionary biomass level (Bpa, as 
defined for each stock in the plan, Article 6), (ii) below Bpa but at or above Blim, or (iii) 
below Blim. An additional constraint that TACs shall never change more than ±20% year-
on-year has a higher priority than all other elements of the HCR (Article 7). The HCR for 
the North Sea stock is similar but differs in several details (e.g., different year-on-year 
reductions in F, and partition into a recovery and long-term phase; Article 8). For all four 
stocks the TACs are to be set according to a short-term forecast based on the F specified 
by the HCR (Articles 7 and 8). The Regulation states that under poor data conditions, 
which do not allow for an analytical assessment and short-term forecast, the TAC shall be 
reduced by 25% or by 15% (the level depending on STECF advice) compared to the TAC 
set in the previous year (Article 9). 
 
2.3 The effort regime, Article 12 
In Article 12 the Regulation stipulates, for each of the four management areas, a 
maximum allowable fishing effort (in kW·days) for each of a series of gear groups of EU 
vessels. Effort adjustments are applied annually to those groups which are together 
responsible for more than 80% of the EU cod catches in each of the management areas. 
Annual reductions of effort will be by the same percentage as specified for F in the HCR 
(or as specified for the TAC under the data-poor condition). There are two provisions 
within the plan that allow (i) for an increase in fishing effort relative to the annual 
allocation (Article 13) and (ii) for the exclusion from the effort regime entirely (Article 
11). 
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2.4 Article 11, excluding groups of vessels from the effort regime based on low cod 
catches 
Article 11 allows Member States to request that groups of vessels are excluded from the 
effort regime if the cod catches do not exceed 1.5% of the total catches of all species 
(landings plus discards) by the group of vessels concerned. The regulation does not 
specify how the 1.5% catch should be achieved, focussing on the outcome rather than the 
technical means to achieve it.  
 
2.5 Article 13, allocating additional effort for highly selective gear and cod-avoiding 
trips 
Article 13 provisions allow for the reclaiming of effort in the following ways: 
13.2. The maximum allowable fishing effort may be increased within effort groups in which the fishing 
activity of one or more vessels: 
(a) is carried out having on board only one regulated gear the technical attributes of which result, 
according to a scientific study evaluated by STECF, in catching less than 1 % cod (highly 
selective gear); 
(b) results in a catch composition of less than 5 % cod per fishing trip (cod-avoiding fishing trips); 
(c) is conducted in accordance with a cod avoidance or discard reduction plan which reduces 
fishing mortality for cod among participating vessels by at least as much as the effort adjustment 
referred to in Article 12(4); or 
(d) is carried out in the west of Scotland area to the west of a line [approximating the 200m  depth 
contour] provided that the participating vessels are equipped with satellite-based vessel monitoring 
systems (VMS). 
 
 
3. Did the plan achieve its objective? 
 
3.1 F targets and stock recovery 
The group [28] concluded that the objectives have not been met as F has not been 
reduced to the levels envisaged by the plan; no reductions in F are observed for the Irish 
Sea and West of Scotland stocks, and an average annual reduction in F of 1.5% for the 
North Sea is observed for 2009 - 2010. For cod in the Kattegat recent trends in F cannot 
be reliably estimated from the assessment; however some reduction in fishing impact has 
likely taken place. While mortality on the stocks is considered to be well above the levels 
intended by the plan, the exact level of F is unknown due to uncertainties arising from 
inter alia unallocated removals (see section 5.1.1), catches in excess of TAC, and other 
sources of mortality. Medium term simulations [28] based on the current rate of change 
per year in F suggest that for the North Sea, the Irish Sea and the West of Scotland stocks 
it is highly unlikely that, following the current implementation approach, F will reach 
Fmsy by 2015. For Kattegat cod it was not possible to evaluate the likely success in terms 
of F reductions by 2015. In contrast, for Eastern Baltic cod the required reductions in F 
have been achieved but under a number of different conditions: this stock is fished in a 
single-species fishery; stronger year classes have occurred; reductions in fishing effort 
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resulted from a substantial tie-up of Polish vessels; and enforcement was improved [29]. 
Although estimated SSB in 2011 for North Sea and West of Scotland cod has increased 
to almost twice the lowest observed SSB (in 2006), the SSBs of all four cod stocks are 
currently likely to have remained below Blim [30, 31].  
 
 
4. Did the plan result in changes conducive to the aims of the plan? 
 
In this section it is examined whether or not the plan resulted in any changes that may 
have helped in the direction towards achieving the aim of the plan. In the next section 
(section 5) factors are explored that may have contributed to the non-achievement of the 
plan. 
 
4.1 TAC setting 
Analytical assessments with short term forecasts were accepted only for the North Sea 
cod stock; the agreed TACs were set in accordance with advice based on the plan’s HCR 
since its implementation in 2009 (Article 8). The cod stocks in the Kattegat, the Irish Sea, 
and the West of Scotland were classified as data-poor due to the lack of short-term 
forecasts, and thus the plan stipulated that their TACs should be set as a percentage of the 
previous year’s TAC (Article 9). For the Irish Sea stock the agreed TACs have indeed 
been set in accordance with the plan since its implementation. For the Kattegat the TACs 
were also set in line with the plan for the first years but the reduction in 2011 was greater 
than specified under the plan. For the West of Scotland cod, in 2009 the TAC was set 
lower than stipulated, in 2010 higher than stipulated, and in 2011 approximately in line 
with the plan. In conclusion, the plan has been successful in setting the TACs in 
accordance with its stipulations. 
  
4.2 Catches 
Overall catches (estimated landings and discards) through time show different trends in 
the different areas (Figure 1), as do patterns of discarding. In the Irish Sea stable catches 
between 2003 and 2008 have been followed by two years of lower values. The estimated 
trawl discard rates are very erratic and there is uncertainty about their reliability. In the 
Kattegat, landings have declined to less than one tenth of the amount reported in 2003. 
Discard rates are highly uncertain but currently estimated at around 30-50% of total cod 
catch with no obvious trend. North Sea catches increased after 2006, reflecting the 
contribution of the relatively larger 2005 year class and associated increases in TAC. 
Discard rates by trawlers with mesh >100 mm in the North Sea were also influenced by 
the 2005 year class and rose to 53% in 2008 followed by a decline to 20% in 2010.  West 
of Scotland catches have fluctuated without any trend between 2003 and 2010 and remain 
high despite progressive reductions in TAC. The predominant cod catching gear there is 
trawl with mesh >100 mm and the discard rate for this gear has risen steadily. In the last 
two years known catches were 6 to 7 times higher than the TAC. 
 
4.3 Effort reductions, Article 12 
There were marked reductions in overall effort in all areas before the cod plan came into 
force, as a result of large decommissioning schemes and the previous cod plan, but these 
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trends levelled off during the first years of the current plan [32] (Figure 1). In all areas, 
regulated effort declined as stipulated by Article 12 of the plan, but it did not decline in 
line with the stipulated F reductions, owing to an elevated baseline (see section 5.2.1) and 
application of Articles 11 and 13. 
 
4.4 Article 11, excluding groups of vessels from the effort regime based on low cod 
catches 
Since the current plan’s implementation, several groups of vessels have been exempted 
from the effort restrictions. Some of these achieved the low cod catches through the use 
of selective gear such as a separator grid (‘technical decoupling’), and others through 
limiting their operations to waters deeper than 200-300 m, which is outside the normal 
distribution of cod (‘spatial decoupling’). However, for some exempted groups of vessels, 
e.g. those targeting saithe or Nephrops, it seems more likely that very low cod catches are 
achieved because the cod stock is severely depleted in the areas of the fishing operations 
(see section 5.3).  
 
Whether it was intended as such or not, Article 11 encouraged fishers to use selective 
gear or fish outside the distribution area of cod or in other ways avoid cod catches. More 
vessels have chosen to use the selective gear (particularly in Sweden) or to fish in the 
deeper waters, as evidenced by the increase in effort by exempted vessels from 2009 to 
2010 [Annex 7 in 28] (Figure 1). Thus, this Article could have contributed positively 
towards achieving the aims of the plan. 
 
4.5 Article 13, allocating additional effort for highly selective gear and cod-avoiding 
trips 
In 2009 and 2010 a number of Member States have used extra effort under Article 13, 
through adopting gear modifications or spatiotemporal measures. Ireland, the UK, 
Sweden and Denmark have all introduced spatial and temporal closures to reduce cod 
catches (Figure 2). 
 
All  Danish  and Swedish vessels  fishing  in  Kattegat  are  subject  to  the  joint  Danish  
and  Swedish  seasonal  and/or  permanent  area  closures  in  Kattegat  and  the  Northern 
part  of  the Sound, implemented from January 2009. In a large part of the closed area, 
only a fishery with selective gears is allowed, which has created incentives for the 
industry to use selective gears. In the first year of implementation of closures, fishing 
effort in Kattegat was moved from high cod density areas to areas with lower cod density. 
However, already in the following year, a large part of the effort was concentrated in the 
closed area, where cod density is in fact highest, but where a fishery (targeting mainly 
Nephrops) with selective gears is allowed [28]. 
 
The Scottish Conservation Credits Scheme (CCS) is a co-management initiative 
involving industry, NGOs, scientists and government officials, that rewards the adoption 
of cod avoidance behaviours and reduced cod catch rates by returning to fishermen some 
of their deducted effort. The scheme has a compulsory element requiring all vessels to 
avoid Real Time Closures (RTCs) [33, 34] and an optional component comprising a 
schedule of alternative selective gears which attract varying degrees of effort buy-back 
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depending on the estimated reduction in cod catch. The level of implementation of the 
spatial measures has been quite high and compliance by Scottish fishermen is reported to 
have been good. Similar RTC schemes applied to all vessels have been introduced in 
other parts of the UK to reduce F on cod. Closed areas are identified based on reports of 
high cod abundance by fishers, through sampling by fisheries-enforcement vessels, or on 
the basis of landings per unit of effort (lpue). 
 
Despite extensive and ongoing research into the development of fishing gears that reduce 
the capture of cod, the uptake of these has been less successful across métiers and areas 
in comparison to adherence with spatial closures. Uptake of species selective gears that 
reduce cod catches in whitefish fisheries have been limited (North Sea) or absent (West 
of Scotland). Uptake of selective gears has been better in Nephrops fisheries in general, 
with widespread use of gears in the Kattegat and some uptake in the Irish Sea. The lower 
levels of uptake are probably due to losses of other target species when trying to exclude 
cod.  
 
It is extremely difficult to evaluate whether the changes in fishing behaviour resulting 
solely from Article 13 have led to reductions in fishing mortality [28, 35]. However, a 
reduction in fishing impact (proxy for fishing mortality) in the Kattegat has likely taken 
place, resulting from a combination of measures (closed areas plus gear regulations) 
covered by Articles 11 and 13 [28]. Similarly, the combination of measures implemented 
in the North Sea through the Scottish CCS in 2009 were considered to have contributed 
to partial F values that were  lower relative to the total F than before implementation [35]. 
In 2010, Scottish North Sea catches were in line with those predicted by ICES forecasts 
and there was a further reduction in Scottish discards, but the estimated reduction in 
catches through the CCS RTCs was only about half that anticipated. The CCS applied to 
the West of Scotland stock was not considered to have reduced cod catches significantly 
[36]. 
 
4.6 Spatial effort distribution 
It might have been expected that fishers faced with limited TACs would have modified 
their fishing activities to avoid areas with high cod abundance while targeting other 
species. This may have happened in the North Sea (see section 4.7); however, an analysis 
of the spatial effort distribution of the main Irish fleets operating in the Irish Sea and 
West of Scotland based on 2006-2010 VMS data suggested that, contrary to the intended 
effect of the plan, the effort deployed in areas with (temporally) medium and high cod 
abundance steadily increased [Annex 9 in 28]. 
 
4.7 Fishers’ perspectives 
As part of the current evaluation of the plan, the EC had financed a sociological study, 
commissioned by the RACs, using a survey among 14 vessel owners and operators in the 
North Sea [Annex 17 in 28]. Fishers in the North Sea reported that they have tried to 
avoid areas with high density of cod and even left areas when it was clear that they were 
catching too much cod, even if they were targeting other species in these areas. This 
behaviour is in accordance with the intentions of the plan. On the other hand, some 
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fishers found that cod TACs were not sufficient, and reported discarding fish above 
minimum landing size, indicating that cod avoidance, if occurring, may not be sufficient.  
 
 
5. Why did the plan not achieve its objectives, and could it have been known in 
advance? 
 
In this section it is discussed what the group identified as possible causes for the plan’s 
current failure to achieve its objectives. Moreover, it is discussed to what extent this 
could have been known in advance; in other words: To what extent were lessons learnt in 
the past ignored? 
 
5. 1. TACs 
 
5.1.1. Discards and unallocated removals are not constrained by TACs 
For all four stocks there have been substantial discards indicating that the TAC was 
unable to restrict total removals from the stock (Figure 3). In 2009 and 2010 known 
catches from the West of Scotland stock were as much as 6 to 7 times the TAC. In 
addition, estimated unallocated removals (unknown mortality) are also high for all four 
stocks, and it remains unclear to what extent the unallocated removals are caused by the 
fisheries (either through black landing or by discarding beyond what can be monitored by 
onboard observers) or biological causes (e.g. migration, additional natural mortality). In 
the case of the West of Scotland stock, an assessment model fitted to landings and 
discards data, survey indices, and estimates of cod consumed-at-age by grey seals in two 
years [37] suggests that predation mortality on cod is greater than previously thought, 
increased with the seal population from the mid 1980s into the mid 1990s, and was not 
accommodated for sufficiently in the treatment of natural mortality in previous 
assessments. Seal predation on cod is primarily on ages 1 to 3 with the greatest predation 
mortality at age 3, at which age it is equivalent to that from fishing. The seal population 
in the area is believed to have been stable since the mid 1990s but the best fit to the 
available data came from a feeding model allowing per-seal predation mortality to 
increase with decreasing cod biomass, suggesting a preference for cod in the seal diet 
rather than consumption simply being a function of encounter rate. Therefore, even with 
a stable seal population, the mortality rate seals impose on cod can continue to rise. The 
high discard rates and non-fishery removals are a serious concern preventing the plan 
from being successful in achieving its objectives. This is confirmed by the example from 
the Baltic Sea, where recent better control over removals played a major role in achieving 
a reduction in fishing mortality on the eastern Baltic cod down to the level corresponding 
to the target of the management plan implemented for the Baltic cod stocks [29]. 
 
5.1.2. The intermediate-year assumption as stipulated in the plan is violated 
For the North Sea stock the setting of the TAC followed the management plan HCR, 
using inputs from the stock assessment and a short-term forecast (Article 8). As 
prescribed in the regulation (Article 7(4); for Article 8 the equivalent prescription has 
been assumed), the short-term forecast was based on the assumption that in the 
intermediate year F would have been reduced in line with the stipulations from the HCR. 
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However, this assumption was analysed and found to be inappropriate; it resulted in an 
under-estimate of the intermediate year fishing mortality compared to that which 
subsequently resulted [28]. The effect of this would be that the F in the TAC year was 
higher than intended by the plan, and this is likely to have contributed (with the increased 
discarding mortality) to the inability of achieving the objectives of the plan. It should be 
noted that, although ICES based the forecast that was used for final advice on the 
assumption that in the intermediate year F would have been reduced in line with the 
HCR, it advised that the stipulated intermediate-year assumption was unlikely to be 
achieved as fishing mortality reductions had not been realised, and included an 
alternative assumption that there was no decrease in F in the intermediate year [38, 39]. 
One likely explanation why managers may have ignored the limitations of the advice was 
the pressure from the fishing industry to increase TACs arguing that this would reduce 
discards of overquota cod. Indeed, it is speculative whether lower TACs would have 
really improved the situation or would have just led to more discards given the general 
bycatch problem in the mixed demersal fishery (discussed in section 5.1.3.). 
 
Where agreed management plans are available and found by ICES to be consistent with 
the precautionary approach (but see section 5.5), ICES will provide advice according to 
the management plan, and will place this advice (usually including a single number 
representing the TAC) in a prominent position in the advisory text (e.g. see p99, “single 
stock exploitation boundary” in [40]). Although ICES always addresses the uncertainty 
related to data, the assessment, and the short term forecast in working group reports and 
advice, these uncertainties do not usually receive the same prominence in the advice text 
as the TAC. Kraak et al. [41] view the requirement of simple answers by the management 
system (i.e. calculating a TAC according to a specified management plan HCR) as 
potentially conflicting with the need for scientific rigour (i.e. pointing out uncertainty and 
the invalidity of the assumptions when they arise), and argued against the mechanisation 
of scientific advice (e.g. by HCRs that are applied without circumspection). Furthermore, 
they propose that fisheries advice should be a dynamic process of expert judgement. Such 
a process does to a certain extent take place in the ICES Advice Drafting Groups, but 
these groups would usually support the outcome of a management plan, if one as 
described above exists. 
 
The application of HCRs without circumspection (here in the context of evaluating the 
ability of HCRs to achieve pre-specified objectives in the face of uncertainty) was one of 
the main reasons why the International Whaling Commission moved away from the 
“New Management Procedure” to develop the “Revised Management Procedure” (RMP) 
in the mid to late-1980s through the pioneering work of de la Mare [7, 42]. The 
simulation framework that underpinned the RMP is currently applied to fish stocks 
world-wide in the form of the “MP Approach” (sometimes also called “Management 
Strategy Evaluation”, “MSE” [16]) [8]. Although the end-product of the MP Approach is 
a management procedure (including HCR) that is run on “auto-pilot” for a period of time 
(typically 3-5 years), it is not without circumspection, because such circumspection has 
gone into the design of the MP Approach framework, and because further circumspection 
is provided through provisions to switch off the “auto-pilot” and re-evaluate the 
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management procedure if assumptions that underlie the MP Approach are violated (e.g. 
the data stray outside the boundaries tested for [7, 43]).  
 
Unfortunately, in the case of the cod plan, the HCR finally adopted had been put into 
force prior to testing by simulation and a formal MP Approach (sensu Rademeyer et al. 
[16]) was not followed (see section 5.5). Furthermore, the evaluation that was conducted 
did not account for the possibility that the intermediate-year assumption of achievement 
of the fishing mortality reductions would be violated. Moreover, no provision had been 
included in the plan that allowed switching off the "auto-pilot" when it was found that the 
intermediate-year assumption was not achieved. Apparently there is no process in place 
that could prevent applying the HCR based on a violated assumption, and the finding that 
reductions in F had actually not realised in the intermediate year therefore did not have 
consequences. 
 
5.1.3. Mixed fisheries 
One of the reasons for discarding (and the non-achievement of F reductions) may be 
given by a ‘lesson learnt’ long ago but not yet heeded: the mixed-fisheries problem [12]. 
Implicitly, a single species TAC assumes that the fishing activity will adapt to the quota 
available for a particular stock, and will lead to the targeted level of fishing mortality. 
The simplest link is to assume that vessels will stop catching a given species once their 
quota for that species is exhausted. The likelihood that this assumption holds true 
declines for complex, multispecies, multi-gear fisheries where fleets are given a set of 
different fishing opportunities for the various stocks. The recent history of the North Sea 
cod is a good example of the problems of using TACs (as landings quotas) to manage 
mixed fisheries. In 2005-2006, the North Sea cod stock was at a historic low biomass 
whereas the stock of haddock, which is to a large extent caught together with cod, was at 
its highest biomass in 30 years [38]. A study on the mixed roundfish fisheries in the 
North Sea [18] made explicit that single-stock management objectives for cod and 
haddock cannot be achieved simultaneously using stock-based annual TACs because of 
conflicting incentives to the fleets. When the quota for cod was exhausted fishermen were 
faced with a dilemma: stop fishing and underutilize the quota for haddock, or continue 
fishing and discard or illegally land overquota catches of cod. If they chose the latter 
options, clearly the cod TAC would not achieve its intended conservation objective. 
Ulrich et al. [12] have developed a tool, Fcube, which is currently used in the ICES 
Working Group on mixed-fisheries advice for the North Sea [44, 45]. Fcube forecasts the 
likely catches of the various species in the mixed assemblage under a variety of 
management scenarios and assumptions about fishers’ behaviour in relation to set quotas. 
 
Fcube can thus forecast to what extent fishing opportunities for the other stocks in the 
assemblage will remain underutilized if all fleets would adjust their activity so as not to 
exceed their portion of the cod TAC; this is a measure of the friction experienced by the 
fishers trying to fully exploit all their fishing opportunities (Figure 4). The chosen 
mechanism deployed within the plan to attempt to restrict fishing activity in line with the 
fishing opportunities for cod, namely the stipulated effort restrictions, must have caused 
such friction (even though it did not prevent overquota catches of cod, see section 5.2) 
(Figure 4). Such friction is indeed reported by fishers, through the stakeholder reports  
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[Annnexes 2 and 3 in 28] as well as the sociological survey [Annex 17 in 28]. 
Unfortunately, mixed fisheries advice is not yet incorporated in the final TAC advice, nor 
used by managers.  
 
In conclusion, scientists and managers could have known that it is unreasonable to rely 
on TACs, implemented as landings quotas, based on single-species considerations, for the 
reduction of F. Not having heeded this learnt lesson has quite likely contributed to the 
failure to achieve the plan's aim. If, for example, landings quotas were to be based on 
mixed-fisheries considerations, a set of landings quotas consistent across the various 
stocks could be agreed, representing a management-imposed compromise between 
overexploiting some and underexploiting other stocks. Then, provided that fisher 
behaviour had been correctly anticipated, overquota catches would be minimal and the 
landings would more closely resemble the agreed intended catches. Alternatively, if 
TACs were to be implemented as catch quotas (landings plus discards) rather than as 
landings quotas, and overquota catches forbidden, then the fishery would have to stop 
fishing when the first quota was exhausted. This would force fishers to change their 
behaviour and may lead to strong improvement in the ability to target species. For 
example, in the Canadian British Columbia trawl fishery, where individual transferable 
quotas govern TACs for 22 species, 100% observer coverage combined with the 
deduction of discard mortality from quotas, incentivised and enabled fishermen to adjust 
the species mixture in their catches [46]. In this instance the species compositions turned 
out not to be fixed, and bycatch of overquota species was not unavoidable. 
 
The important conclusion for the future plans is that, in developing measures, it is 
important to include the likely responses by the fishery, not just to consider the headline 
targets from an HCR. This could be done in several ways:  factoring in the responses; 
changing the regulatory approach to one that would function better; include likely levels 
of compliance in the study; and provide a technical annex to the regulation to modify the 
calculations if the indications are that the desired results are not being achieved (i.e. a 
possibility to switch off the “auto-pilot”). In this context, it would be useful to follow a 
full MP Approach including the dimension of fisher behaviour [2]. 
 
5.2. Effort 
 
5.2.1. Effort baselines were too high 
Baselines for Member States’ allocations of effort (Kw·days) were related to a recent 
reference period (either 2004-2006 or 2005-2007, the choice of period being up to each 
Member State) irrespective of whether and when Member States had undertaken capacity 
reduction through decommissioning schemes or other means. This has meant that effort 
control has been experienced very differently by Member States depending on whether 
decommissioning and other measures took place during the reference period or earlier. 
Furthermore, in most cases the effort deployed in 2008 was already lower than the 
starting baseline (i.e. the effort in the reference period). Because the subsequent effort 
reductions were relative to the starting baseline while the F reductions were relative to the 
F in 2008, the allowed effort in 2009 could be higher than the 2008 effort or at least 
reduced to a lesser extent than the stipulated F reduction relative to 2008 (and similarly 
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for effort and F in 2010 relative to 2009). This resulted in regulated effort reductions 
being smaller than specified F reductions. Indeed, in some cases effort has not yet been 
restrictive, even after the successive reductions of allowed effort since 2008. This may 
have contributed to the failure to achieve the plan's aim. 
 
5.2.2. Effort reductions do not necessarily result in proportional F reductions 
Article 12 stipulates effort reductions by the same percentages as the reductions in F 
(according to the HCR, Articles 7 or 8) or TAC (Article 9). This does not imply that the 
regulation assumes a proportional relationship between F and effort. The regulation 
simply stipulates that effort reductions are continued until F is reduced to the required 
target value. Indeed there are many reasons why the proportionality between F and effort 
may not occur [47-51]. Factors influencing the partial F exerted per unit effort (Fpue) by 
a vessel, include skipper skills, auxiliary equipment, gear, the area and the season of the 
fishing operation, costs, revenues, and other incentives leading to business decisions such 
as targeting or avoidance. This implies that, depending on the predictability of 
catchability by fishers, management-imposed reductions in effort might not translate 
directly into a proportional reduction in F. Fishers faced with such effort reductions can 
allocate their remaining effort such that they maximise catches of their targeted species to 
minimise the impact on revenue. Another effect is that the spatial distribution of a stock 
may contract with declining population biomass but without affecting the fish densities in 
the core habitat of the species [52]. Thus, if fishers faced with effort reductions contract 
their activity to these core habitats, fishing mortality may remain high despite the reduced 
effort. According to the sociological survey [Annex 17 in 28], the plan indeed had the 
effect that fishers had behaved more efficiently in order to maximise revenues from 
fishing trips. The economic analysis of the group [28] (regarding a subset of fleet 
segments operating in the North Sea only) found that overall revenues-per-unit-effort 
increased while costs-per-unit-effort decreased over the period 2006-2009. Aggregate 
fishing profitability increased over the period, but the importance of cod in total fishing 
revenues declined. Fleet capacity was reduced, but consolidation has been in favour of 
larger, more powerful and more efficient vessels (following the general predictions of 
[47, 51]). Clearly these changes in fisher behaviour and fleet structure would not likely 
result in a decline of cod F proportional to the decrease in effort.  
 
As an illustration of the potential of revenue-maximising behaviour, logbook data from 
Irish demersal trawl trips in 2010 indicate that if the 25% least efficient trips (those with 
the lowest revenue per unit effort) are omitted from the dataset, the cod catches are only 
diminished by 5% and 7% respectively for the directed cod fisheries (in the Irish Sea and 
West of Scotland with mesh size >99 mm), and by 23% in a bycatch fishery (in the Irish 
Sea with mesh size 70-99 mm)  [Annex 6 in 28]. This also suggests that the relationship 
between effort and F in target and bycatch fisheries may be different: the relationship 
between effort and F may be much more linear for a situation where cod is caught in a 
bycatch fishery. This is also shown for North Sea cod over the period 2003-2009  [Figure 
5.1 and Annex 12 in 28], where the trends in F are better correlated to the trends in effort 
of gears catching cod as a bycatch (Nephrops trawl with mesh 70-99 mm and flatfish 
beam trawls) than in cod-targeting trawls with mesh >100 mm. Thus, effort limitations 
may be effective in controlling bycatch but have less impact on controlling F in target 
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fisheries as these fishers can modify their behaviour to mitigate the effort regulation. 
Nevertheless, this interesting notion needs further study to be corroborated. 
 
5.3. Article 11, excluding groups of vessels from the effort regime based on low cod 
catches 
STECF [53] has pointed out that the current low cod stock is likely to result in catches of 
cod of particular groups of vessels being <1.5% of total catch, allowing them to qualify 
for effort exemptions. These vessels could potentially negate any attempts to reduce cod 
mortality and could inhibit re-colonisation of depleted areas and in turn stock rebuilding. 
 
The use of bycatch limits as specified in Article 11 (and Article 13, see section 5.4) is a 
potential flaw in the design of the plan. There is no a priori clear relation between the 
percentage of cod in the catch and the fishing mortality rate on cod: (i) a low cod 
percentage may be achieved when abundance of cod is low but in such a case it would 
represent a high F; (ii) a lower cod percentage may also be achieved by increasing the 
catches of other species (while keeping cod catches at similar levels) and a perverse 
incentive may arise in favour of using smaller mesh gears to achieve a higher overall 
catch; (iii) catch compositions also depend on the relative abundances of the various 
other stocks in the mixed catch assemblage so that a small cod percentage may simply be 
indicative of higher abundances of other stocks; (iv) if many vessels have a small 
percentage of cod in their catch, the total amount of cod caught may still be high. The 
latter also applies if very many vessels are exempted on the basis of their use of selective 
gear, since these gears always continue to catch some cod. 
 
Despite the identification of bycatch limits as potentially flawed, it does not seem that the 
use of Article 11 has greatly contributed to the failure of the plan to achieve the stated 
objectives, since very few exemptions have been granted under this Article and the 
catches of cod by vessels exempted from the effort regime under Article 11 represented 
only a small proportion of the overall cod catches made by regulated gears (5% or less) 
(Figure 1).  
 
5.4. Article 13, allocating additional effort for highly selective gear and cod-avoiding 
trips 
The verification aspects of Article 13 are too complex [28, 35], especially for areas where 
there is no analytical assessment. It is difficult to disentangle the effects of specific and 
multiple measures on F, particularly when the entire fleet participates in the programme 
(as in the Scottish case) because there is no possibility to compare against vessels that are 
not participating. Despite the difficulties in formal evaluation, observations point to 
positive effects and reduced catches of cod in some areas operating under Article 13 
although the effect is not apparent everywhere (e.g. not on the West of Scotland stock). 
Overall, the allocation of additional effort under Article 13 has in the majority of cases 
not been demonstrably accompanied by the required reduction in F on cod owing to the 
avoidance measures implemented. This may have contributed to the failure of achieving 
the plan’s objectives. 
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Since the provisions of Article 13(a) and (b) are based on catch composition limits 
expressed as percentages of cod in the catch, these article members suffer from the same 
design flaw as was discussed above (section 5.3). 
 
5.5. Impact assessments 
In 2008-2009, impact assessments of the plans were carried out by ICES; all these impact 
assessments, except for North Sea cod, were conducted after the plans were already in 
force [54, 55]. Even in the case of the North Sea cod plan, what was evaluated prior to 
implementation was proposals from the EC and Norway [54], and not the plan that was 
eventually implemented (which was only evaluated after implementation) [38]. Various 
scenarios were tested, but in its final advice for the North Sea plan ICES [56] had 
assumed that the annual effort reduction and the intended F would be fully achieved. 
ICES [56] considered the North Sea cod plan to be “in accordance with the precautionary 
approach if it is implemented and enforced adequately” [our italics] and stated that 
“discarding in excess of the assumptions [our italics] under the management plan will 
affect the effectiveness of the plan”, and noted that “the evaluation is most sensitive to 
assumptions about implementation error [our italics] (i.e. TAC and effort overshoot and 
the consequent increase in discards) and a continuation of the current low recruitment.”. 
 
It would have been helpful if the Terms of Reference of the request for advice from ICES 
in its impact assessment had included a request for an exploration of the likelihood of 
adequate implementation and enforcement [2]. It could have been predicted that fisher 
response under the proposed regulations might give rise to increased discarding (e.g. 
owing to the mixed nature of the fisheries), and ICES could thus have advised on the 
more likely medium-term projection. In this case, the managers adopted the plan without 
advice on the likely fishery responses even though it was stated that its effectiveness 
would be very sensitive to the likelihood of adequate implementation, and no mechanism 
to switch off the “auto-pilot” was incorporated into the plan. It should be reiterated that it 
would be useful to follow the full MP Approach (e.g. as described in [16] including the 
consideration of fisher behaviour [2]) in the mixed-fishery context, and if possible 
including likely implementation issues related to responses to provisions such as Articles 
11 and 13. 
 
5.6. Stakeholder views 
In 2007 two stakeholder groups [the North Sea RAC (NSRAC) and the North Western 
Waters RAC (NWWRAC)] jointly organised a Cod Recovery Symposium held in 
Edinburgh [57]. The symposium reviewed the previous cod recovery plan [Council 
Regulation (EC) No 423/2004]. In the course of 2008 the EC and Norway published 
separate proposals for a new cod plan [58], resulting (after combining elements of the 
two proposals and implementing further modifications) in the plan currently in place. The 
RACs responded to the proposal with a number of opinion documents before the current 
plan came into force [59-62]. In the 2011 review process [28], the stakeholders were 
invited as observers to the scientific meetings and to submit their views in written 
documents. Two opinion documents, one of each RAC, were provided [Annexes 2 and 3 
respectively in 28]. These opinion documents indicate that the cod plan is not fully 
supported by the stakeholders, in this specific case the fishing (capture) section of the 
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industry. The NSRAC states that consultation before the plan was introduced had been 
inadequate. 
 
In their opinion documents the RACs addressed a number of concerns relating to the 
design, development and implementation phases. They identified some perceived 
deficiencies and omissions in the plan, a lack of consultation during its development and 
a number of difficulties experienced in its implementation. Many of the concerns related 
to the effort allocation procedures which were felt to be based on overly rigid gear 
groupings that did not sufficiently account for the polyvalent nature of some fleet 
components and restricted the re-direction of effort to other fisheries. Concerns regarding 
the assumed link between fishing effort and fishing mortality were specifically 
highlighted. It was noted that economic issues were not considered during the 
development of the plan and that the percentage reductions in TAC and effort appeared to 
have been set at arbitrary levels, especially for the data-poor case. For the NSRAC it was 
of major concern that the plan continued to manage the fishery through landings limits 
and not through restrictions on total catch. This has in some cases led to conflicts with 
existing catch composition regulations and given rise to so-called regulatory discarding. 
The RACs commented that it has proved extraordinarily difficult to gain exemptions 
under Article 11 for vessels that do not catch cod. In particular, they experienced a lack 
of transparency over the criteria used to deliver exemption and over the data to be 
collected. Another issue highlighted by the RACs was that, in terms of implementation of 
the plan, there have been different approaches by different Member States and that the 
plan has not been easy to implement; it has shifted responsibility from the Commission to 
Member States, and has placed a very heavy burden on administrators and the fishing 
industry. 
 
Both RACs support the notion of reducing cod F to sustainable levels and the necessity of 
taking up cod avoidance measures, but encounter a multitude of problems for the industry 
to do so. The RACs advocate effective cod avoidance measures on a fishery-by-fishery 
basis, to be obtained with the full involvement and cooperation of the fishers through 
selective gear, spatial and temporal avoidance, fully documented fisheries, and discard 
reduction strategies; the adaptive nature of the implementing rules and a results-based 
management would be the foundations for the success of any future cod management 
plan. Already at the Edinburgh symposium the RACs had emphasised the need for 
incentives to achieve cod avoidance. Both RACs appreciate the ‘spirit’ of the Article 13 
provision but found it in practice non-transparent and difficult to implement.  
 
The sociological survey [Annex 17 in 28] revealed that 8 out of the 14 respondents 
thought that other species were adversely affected by the plan through increased 
discarding or targeting, and 12 respondents indicated they had discarded fish, cod and 
other species, as a result of the plan (for example by high grading). However, it is unclear 
by what mechanism the cod plan encouraged the discarding of other species. 
Respondents favoured more flexible rules that are more locally adaptable, or even down 
to the level of each vessel, for example allowing them to switch gear, in order to reflect 
the natural variability of the resource. Some would favour vessel-specific quotas (already 
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available in some Member States), so that the fishers are able to decide when to fish 
based on their own economic considerations. 
 
Apparently the cod plan was not supported by the stakeholders, and this may have 
contributed to the failure to achieve the plan’s aims. In order for a plan to be successful, 
the problems mentioned by the RACs must be taken into account, not only because 
stakeholder support is important for compliance [19-23], but also because some of these 
problems have actually made adequate implementation of the plan much more difficult. 
 
5.7. Economic consequences 
In a critical paper on the previous cod plan, Kelly et al. [63] had commented that the plan 
had not considered the fishers’ loss of revenue caused by reduced opportunities to fish 
(including other species), and recommended that future plans should consider these more 
explicitly. Unfortunately, the current cod plan did not do so, and this may have 
contributed to the failure to achieve the plan’s aims. While it is not clear to the present 
authors in what form these should be considered, it seems a truism that ignoring them 
will not help to the success of a management plan. Murawski [5] also warned that 
sometimes the economic benefits in the fishing industry are substantially reallocated in 
the course of a plan’s life, but that these economic consequences are often not anticipated 
or at least not explicitly communicated, exacerbating the gulf between managers and 
fishers. Failure to make explicit society’s choices about how to restructure the fisheries to 
become sustainable may undermine the credibility of recovery programmes. 
 
 
6. Conclusions 
Some aspects of the plan worked towards reaching the objectives. Regulated fishing 
effort was reduced and/or is deployed under cod-avoidance conditions. Notably, through 
Article 13, the uptake of selective gear has started to increase in some areas, as well as 
the implementation of spatiotemporal measures such as permanent and real-time 
temporary closures. Stakeholders were in principle positive about Article 13, presumably 
because this allows fishers to avoid cod in a flexible way while trying to minimise the 
impact on other fishing opportunities. The uptake of selective gear and fishing at depths 
outside the distribution area of cod were also increased through Article 11, although this 
is variable across all areas; the maximum uptake has been seen in the Kattegat Nephrops 
fishery, with either moderate or minimal uptake in other areas. In general, some fishers 
report that they avoided cod, although cod avoidance outside the provisions of Articles 11 
and 13 was not corroborated scientifically. 
 
Factors contributing to the failure to achieve the plan’s objectives can be summarized as 
follows: 
• Although the TACs were set according to the plan’s stipulations, in the case of the 
North Sea the TAC setting was based on assumed intermediate-year reductions in 
mortality that were not achieved in reality – which was known. Nevertheless, the 
increases in TAC resulting from this were likely small and it is not clear whether 
lower TACs would have resulted in better performance of the plan. 
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• In a mixed-fishery context, relying on TACs implemented as landings quotas that 
are based on single-species considerations to control F is a flawed concept. A 
well-known cause for overquota discards in mixed demersal fisheries is the 
discrepancy between fishing opportunities for the different species and the tension 
this causes for fishers responding to economic considerations. Ignoring this 
amounts to ignoring the dimension of the fishers as rationally behaving agents. 
• The effort restrictions were not effective, because the reductions started from 
baselines which for some member States were above the actual effort levels 
exerted in the year prior to the first year of the plan; consequently the realised 
reductions were less than the stipulated reductions in F. Moreover, it was known 
that broad-brush proportionality between effort and F is often invalid, especially 
in the case of a directed fishery, and the actual relationship is likely to be 
complex, non-linear, and probably fishery-dependent. This is another behavioural 
dimension that was ignored. 
• The allocation of additional effort under Article 13 has in the majority of cases 
not been demonstrably accompanied by the required reduction in F on cod owing 
to the avoidance measures implemented.   
• Although the impact assessments had warned that the success of the plan was 
sensitive to implementation error, the problems of implementation related to the 
likely fishery responses to the plan were not explored. 
• The stakeholders, in this case the fishing (capture) section of the industry, did not 
fully support the plan; in particular, they did not support TACs implemented as 
landings quotas and they did not support effort reductions. Lack of stakeholder 
support not only diminishes compliance, but may also reflect the inability to 
adequately implement the plan. Problems experienced by the stakeholders were: 
contradictory requirements, lack of flexibility, and definitions of vessel groupings 
that were too broad. 
From this list it appears that a major reason for the failure to achieve the plan's aims has 
been that fisher behaviour was not fully taken into account in the design, the impact 
assessment, and the annual implementation of the plan (see also [2]). 
 
Factors that may have contributed negatively to the achievement of the plan’s objectives 
are: 
• The plan has been difficult to administer, especially with regards to Articles 11, 
12 and 13. 
• It is difficult to evaluate whether groups of vessels qualify to operate under 
Articles 11 and 13. Moreover, an evaluation of the effectiveness of Article 13 is 
difficult. 
• The plan had no explicit economic dimension or objectives; it has not been 
communicated explicitly how the industry, or society for that matter, would have 
to deal with reductions in revenues. 
 
A more general flaw was highlighted [28] which potentially affects numerous fishery 
regulations. The flaw relates to defining vessel catch limits in terms of catch composition, 
i.e. as percentage of the vessel’s total catch, instead of regulating the total catch of (in this 
case) cod caught by the fleet segments.  
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7. Ways forward – old problems – new problems – new solutions 
 
Some of the aspects identified above can be improved by, for example, the allocation of a 
total allowable catch of cod (landings plus discards) – in tonnes, not as a percentage of 
their catch – to each segment or vessel of the fleet. This would provide fishermen with a 
target that is directly measurable by them and relates well to fishing mortality on cod. 
Obviously, it would be necessary for this catch to be monitored to show that this had not 
been exceeded (similar to the current requirement under Article 11/13 criteria). 
Indications from the RACs are that they are prepared to consider such catch quotas, 
although at this stage it is unclear if all Member States are willing to take on the costs of 
the necessary compliance checks. Elsewhere it has been found that 100% observer 
coverage in combination with catch limits in the form of ITQs provided an incentive to 
change targeting behaviour in a mixed fishery [46]; recent developments in Europe 
involving CCTV and catch quotas may provide similar incentives. One key aspect of this 
approach is that it results in internalisation of the costs of fishing. In the current system 
with landings quotas, the cost of catching in excess of those quotas in terms of loss to the 
resource, is shared by everyone (fishers as well as the society at large, now as well as in 
the future), giving rise to the tragedy of the commons [20] where individual rational 
fishers do not experience an incentive to optimize targeting and minimize discarding. 
Catch quotas bring these costs back to the actor because the sanctions on overquota 
fishing are experienced directly at the level of the individual fisher and thus have to be 
taken into account into the fishers’ business decisions; this will drive rational fishers to 
adjust their targeting behaviour to the agreed fishing opportunities [46]. Another 
possibility to achieve this would be to allocate quotas of ‘fishing pressure credits’ to 
fishers, with spatiotemporally varying tariffs (in effect, limiting effort in a 
spatiotemporally differentiated manner) [64, 65]. In this approach, agreed fishing 
opportunities are translated into a total amount of available credits, but fishers pay more 
credits per day from their quotas when fishing in high-abundance areas than when fishing 
in low-abundance areas; this way cod-avoidance is incentivised while retaining the 
fishers’ flexibility [64, 65]. Another possibility would be the payment of ‘overquota 
landing tax’, a system currently implemented in New Zealand, and explored for European 
stocks [66].  
 
Apart from the flawed use of catch percentages as criterion, Article 13 is the most 
promising element of the plan for three reasons: (i) it follows the paradigm of 
participatory governance and results-based management; (ii) it has a direct relation to the 
objectives through controlling the actual catches; and (iii) it has the potential for fine-
tuning of measures to specific fisheries. Nevertheless, its formal requirements (in its 
current form) to show that it delivers F reductions are problematic. 
 
The requirements from a recovery plan need to be framed in terms of results-based 
management with a selection of measurable aspects that will show whether the chosen 
approach is achieving its objectives. A combination of metrics is required: in the short-
term (annually or within-year) performance should be monitored through metrics that 
focus on measurable changes in fisher behaviour (such as changes in catches, shifts in 
effort allocation to certain gears, métiers, areas and seasons in relation to cod 
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concentrations), and for the medium-term, over several years, the effectiveness should be 
evaluated through metrics such as stock status and mortality. The evaluation of the 
effectiveness of the plan’s measures probably has to be deferred a few years into the 
future, when more reliable estimates become available of stock status and of whether the 
intended reductions in F have actually occurred and the objectives been achieved. 
Currently, the HCR in the plan is overly reliant on annual estimates of F which are either 
absent, inaccurate or imprecise. Consideration should be given to multiannual metrics, 
such as mean F and SSB over the last 3 years, for informing decisions. 
 
While fisheries managers are adjusting to the new paradigm of governance, results-based 
management, and reversal of the burden-of-proof, and its opportunities and limitations, 
another promising paradigm shift is happening: real-time high-resolution spatiotemporal 
data on vessel activity (VMS) and catches (electronic logbooks and fully documented 
fishing) are becoming available. These may allow for management measures to be set and 
tailored to specific fisheries at a finer spatiotemporal scale, such as the seasonal and real-
time closures implemented under Article 13 (and new approaches proposed [e.g. 64]), 
than the grand-scale overall TACs and effort limitations which are based on rough large-
scale annual estimates at the level of the stock and the management area. 
 
Drawing on the experiences of successful management regimes in other parts of the 
world and taking on board some of the lessons learnt from recent EU management plan 
experience, the further development of cod plans might usefully include the following 
considerations.  
I. Through the implementation of catch quotas (landings plus discards) the fishers 
will experience internalisation of the costs of discarding, which they will then 
have to take into account in their business decisions. Catch quotas are also 
more directly related to the parameter of interest (F) than landings quotas or 
catch composition percentages or broad-brush effort limits. 
II.  Through participatory governance, such as in Article 13, stakeholders are 
encouraged to phrase plans that suit their fishery practices, which will result in 
greater stakeholder buy-in and compliance. Such plans could include: locally 
organised schemes to give increased access where the impact on cod is the 
least; further technical development towards selective gear able to catch one 
or a few targeted species at a time, which would alleviate issues related to 
mixed fisheries and allow for a much easier management of the different 
sections of the fleet; flexibility at a fine spatiotemporal scale and at fishery-
by-fishery level – with different options available to the individual fisher – 
suited to the actual stock distribution and the fishing practices, which will help 
to prevent perverse incentives; explicit inclusion of mixed-fisheries issues at 
the local scale. All these plans would need monitoring in the short term to 
show that catches (landings and discards) of cod were in line with the 
allocated quotas. If these measures result in losses in revenue that have a 
serious impact these will need to be explicitly considered, otherwise the 
economic drivers will likely reduce the effectiveness of any control measures 
and discourage participation or uptake of more selective harvesting. 
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III. The use of multiple metrics at different appropriate time-scales to estimate the 
performance and effectiveness of the management (e.g., catches, effort 
allocation to gears, métiers, areas and seasons at an annual or within-year time 
scale; stock-status parameters evaluated over a number of years) will help to 
evaluate whether the regulatory measures are achieving the stated objectives. 
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Figure 1. Time series for the four cod stocks. Catch is pictured for regulated and 
unregulated gear, where catch taken by vessels operating under Articles 11 and 13 
respectively is displayed separately. Catch refers to landings and discards as raised by 
procedures outlined in [32]. Effort is pictured for all regulated gear only, where effort by 
vessels operating under Articles 11 and 13 respectively is displayed separately. 
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Figure 2. The location of permanent, seasonal, and real-time closures. The yellow 
rectangle (in ICES division VIa on the northern coast of Northern Ireland) represents the 
seasonal closure that the Irish authorities have introduced, closed from 1 October to 31 
March to all Irish vessels, irrespective of fishing method. This period coincides with peak 
cod catches. The red polygons (in ICES divisions VIa and IVa to the north and northeast 
of Scotland) represent the RTCs in 2010 under the Scottish Conservation Credits 
Scheme; blue polygons in the same area represent other closures directed at protecting 
cod. The red circles and the grey rectangles (in ICES divisions IVb, IVc and VIId; the 
North Sea) represent the UK closures during 2010: 5 seasonal closures (red circles), 3 of 
one month and 2 of four months in duration covering spawning locations for North Sea 
cod; 105 real time closures (grey rectangles), with 82 in offshore areas of 7.5 x 8.5 miles 
closed for 1 month, and 20 in inshore areas of 6.5 x 3.5 miles closed for 14 days, based 
on lpue records; as well as 3 areas of 7.5 x 8.5 miles closed for 21 days for the protection 
of juvenile cod, identified on the basis of live sampling. The black, orange, and red 
shapes (in ICES area IIIa, Kattegat) represent the Danish and Swedish spatial closures in 
Kattegat and the Northern part of the Sound. The “black” area is closed during the 1st 
January-31st March (spawning season), except for fisheries with selective gears with a 
very low catch of cod; The “black” area in the Northern Sound (”Kilen” or the triangle) is 
closed 1st February-31st March, except for fisheries with selective gears; The “orange” 
area is closed for all fisheries except fisheries with selective gears. The “red” area is 
closed for all fisheries, including recreational fisheries. 
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Figure 3. Agreed TACs and removals in 2009 and 2010 for the four cod stocks. 
Unallocated removals are estimated by the assessment model as removed fish in excess 
of observed catches and assumed natural mortality. For the assessments of the North Sea 
and West of Scotland stocks the observed catches have a reported landings and a discards 
component (the discards component is derived through a raising procedure from observed 
trips). For the assessments of the Irish Sea and the Kattegat the catches include only 
reported landings, while no raised observed discards are included; thus, in these cases the 
model estimates of unallocated removals may include discards. In the case of the Kattegat 
stock discard estimates (which were not used in the assessment) are available, and for this 
figure subtracted from the unallocated removals (so that total removals are, in all cases, 
removals above assumed natural mortality). Thus, note that the ‘absence’ of discards in 
the figure for the Irish Sea stock does not imply that there are no discards, but just that 
they have not been estimated separately. In all cases, the unallocated removals may 
include unobserved or non-estimated discards, additional natural mortality, or may be due 
to model misspecification. Information is from [30, 67-69]. 
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Figure 4. Potential landings (i.e. the marketable component of the catch, as opposed to 
discards) in 2011 by stock, as estimated from a two-years Fcube mixed-fisheries short-
term forecast, as in the stock-assessment year 2010. Three scenarios are displayed: 
“Sq_E”: the effort by fleet in 2010 and 2011 was set as equal to the effort in the latest 
data year (2009). “cod”: The underlying assumption was that all fleets set their effort at 
the level corresponding to their cod quota share both in 2010 and 2011, regardless of 
other stocks. “Ef_Mgt”: The effort in métiers that used gear controlled by the EU effort 
management regime had effort adjusted according to the cod plan. In 2010, that implies a 
13.3% effort reduction in TR1 and TR2 gear categories compared to 2009, and another 
15.4% reduction in 2011 compared to 2010. Coloured horizontal lines correspond to the 
landings estimated from the single species forecast. See [12] for more explanation.  
 
